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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This action arises out of Wagner's supplying construction 
materials for the construction of approximately 25,000 square feet of 
office space configured in two complexes for Hercules. Two causes of 
action were brought against Hercules. On motion for summary judgment, 
the trial court dismissed Wagner's cause of action for foreclosure of 
its mechanic's lien against Hercules interest in the subject property. 
This dismissal was based upon the trial court's legal conclusion that 
Hercules' interest in the subject property was not alienable and, 
therefore, was not subject to attachment by a mechanic's lien. 
Following trial, the court dismissed Wagner's cause of action against 
Hercules for failure to obtain a payment bond. This dismissal was 
based upon the trial court's legal conclusion that the office 
complexes did not constitute an improvement upon land. 
Wagner vigorously objected to the findings of fact and 
conclusions of law and a final judgment prepared by Hercules based, in 
part, upon the exclusion of undisputed facts which should have been 
and were in fact part of the factual analysis upon which the trial 
court based its legal conclusions. Despite these objections by Wagner 
to the findings of fact and conclusions of law and to the final 
judgment, the trial court signed and entered the findings of fact and 
conclusions of law and the final judgment in substantially the same 
form as prepared by Hercules. 
On appeal, the Utah Court of Appeals reversed both the dismissal 
of Wagner's mechanic's lien cause of action and the dismissal of 
Wagner's cause of action for failure to obtain a payment bond against 
Hercules. 
The facts in this case are mostly undisputed. However, the facts 
1 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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as stated by Hercules, while mostly accurate, do contain some 
inaccuracies and mischaracterizations. Furthermore, facts helpful to 
this Court's understanding of the case were omitted by Hercules. 
Therefore, Wagner sets forth facts hereafter which attempt to overcome 
the inadequacies in Hercules' statement of the case. 
1. This action arises out of the Wagner supplying construction 
materials for the construction of approximately 25,000 square feet of 
office space in two complexes for Defendant-Appellee Hercules. Trial 
Transcript — R. at 640, pp. 50 & 51. 
2. The office space was constructed in two office complexes with 
30 modular office units, 14 feet by 60 feet each. One complex 
contains 19 units, Annex 15, and the other complex contains 11 units, 
Annex 16. Affidavit of Chilton Leach, Exhibit 3 — R. at 217. 
3. Hercules entered into a contract with Defendant Modulaire for 
the construction of the office complexes on property located 
approximately at 4100 South 8400 West (Affidavit of Ryder Christian 
Waring, Exhibit 2 -- R. at 247); Modulaire entered into a subcontract 
with Space Building Systems for the completion to "complete interior 
rough & finish walls & ceiling complete" (Affidavit of Chilton Leach, 
Exhibit 4, Cover Sheet and Article 1.1 — R. at 226);1 
4. From July 8, 1985, through September 26, 1985, Wagner 
supplied certain construction supplies and materials to Space Building 
Systems, which were installed, integrated and incorporated into the 
office complexes (Trial Transcript at p. 7. Trial Transcript, 
Testimony of Robert Spencer, Ben Gabaldon and Larry Bills) and Wagner 
1
 On October 10, 1985, Space Building Systems filed for 
relief under Chapter 11 of the United States Bankruptcy 
Code. 
2 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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was not paid by Space Building Systems in full for the materials it 
furnished to the project (Trial Transcript at pp. 11-13). Defendants 
refused to make payment therefor. 
5. The construction contract between Space Building and 
Modulaire is an Associated General Contractors of America Standard 
Subcontract Agreement for Building Construction (hereinafter 
"subcontract"), with Modulaire?s name and logo attached to the title 
page, signed as subcontractor and contractor, respectively. Affidavit 
of Chilton Leach, Exhibit 4, Subcontract Cover Sheet and pp. 1, 7 --
R. at 226. The subcontract refers to Hercules as the Owner. 
Affidavit of Chilton Leach, Exhibit 4, subcontract Cover Sheet -- R. 
at 226. 
6. The subcontract of Space Building Systems encompassed 
complete "electrical rough & finish interior." Affidavit of Chilton 
Leach, Exhibit 4, section 1.1 -- R. at 226. 
7. The subcontract entitled Modulaire to lien waivers from Space 
Building, allowed deduction of payments to Space Building from 
Modulaire due to any claim of lien, required Space Building to keep 
the building reasonably clean from debris, permitted Modulaire to 
require a performance bond and labor and material payment bond if it 
so chose, and stated that any disputes arising from the subcontract 
shall be decided by arbitration in accordance with the Construction 
Industry Arbitration Rules of the American Arbitration Association. 
Affidavit of Chilton Leach, Exhibit 4, articles 2.1, 2.4, 2.5, 3.6, 6 
and 10.1 (Emphasis Supplied) — R. at 226. 
£• The Purchase Order between Modulaire and Hercules for 
procurement of the office complexes refers to them as "complexes" and 
"office complexes." Affidavit of Chilton Leach, Exhibit 3, pp. 1, 4 -
3 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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- R. at 217, 
9. The Purchase Order states that Hercules is "responsible for 
site preparation, sewer, water and electrical service hookups." Ld. at 
2. 
10. Complete water, sewer, telephone and electrical lines have 
been constructed and affixed to the office complexes; the wheels and 
hitches are removed; concrete sidewalks and stairs with steel railings 
lead to the office complexes; grading was performed in preparation for 
the office complexes; significant amounts of asphalt were placed to 
create extensive parking areas with the asphalt fitting snugly within 
the serrated skirting and extending halfway up the skirting in 
certain areas; several units are joined to form expansive office 
complexes; Annex 15 is "L" shaped, joined by an enclosed, suspended 
walkway; Annex 16 is terraced and joined by interior stairwells; rain 
gutters and air conditioning units are attached; the interior is 
completely finished with carpet and drywall overlapping the joints of 
the connected, prefabricated shells; the office complexes, costing 
nearly one half million dollars, rest on a permanent foundation of 
cinder block; and the proposal for expansion of the parking lot for 
Annex 16 refers to the annex as "Building." Affidavit of Kurt C. 
Faux; Exhibit "1" — R. at 405. 
11. The Use Agreement with the United States Government grants 
Hercules wide-ranging use and control of all the "facilities" (the 
term "facilities" under the Use Agreement means "all property provided 
under the contract"). Affidavit of Ryder Christian Waring, Exhibit 2, 
General Provisions For Facilities Use Contracts, Clause Numbers 1, 2, 
6, 8, 10, 13, 14, 15 and 29 — R. at 247. 
12. The photographic exhibits presented at the trial clearly 
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show that the removal of a modular office complex near the subject 
complexes left large holes in the asphalt, conduit and utility stub-
outs protruding from the ground, etc. 
13. The interior walls of the office complexes were finished 
with traditionally finished drywall partition walls rather than 
"demountable" partitions as stated by Hercules. The document at 
Record 170, Exhibit 4, does not specify demountable partitions as 
Hercules would lead this Court to believe. The testimony at the trial 
was that while demountable partitions were common in the Modulaire 
office units, the Hercules units were of traditional interior wall 
finish. 
ARGUMENT 
The best argument for Wagner's position in opposing Hercules' 
petition is in the Court of Appeals' Opinion. It is a well reasoned 
legal approach to the factual circumstances presented in this case. 
Wagner encourages this Court to read the Opinion of the Court of 
Appeals. 
I. HERCULES HAS FAILED TO IDENTIFY FOR THE COURT ANY VALID "SPECIAL 
AND IMPORTANT REASONS" WHICH WOULD JUSTIFY THE ISSUANCE OF A WRIT 
OF CERTIORARI. 
As a preliminary matter, Wagner does not believe that Hercules 
has complied with the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure which govern 
petitions for certiorari from the Utah Court of Appeals to the Utah 
Supreme Court. Rule 49(e) states that "The failure of the petitioner 
to present with accuracy, brevity, and clarity whatever is essential 
to a ready understanding of the points requiring consideration will be 
sufficient grounds for denying the petition." There is a reason for 
this rule. A petition for certiorari is not the means of arguing the 
merits of the case, but is to provide the Court with enough 
5 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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information to determine whether to actually issue a writ of 
certiorari and hear the merits of the case. 
Rather than presenting a brief, concise and clear petition, 
Hercules has chosen to burden the Court with a lengthy discussion of 
the details of the case which do not assist the Court in determining 
whether to issue a writ of certiorari. Therefore, Wagner requests 
that the Court deny the Hercules' petition for lack of brevity and 
clarity. 
Hercules has requested that this Court review the Utah Court of 
Appeals decision in this case which was filed on August 31, 1990.2 
However, Hercules has failed to present this Court with valid reasons 
upon which to grant a review. Furthermore, there are no valid reasons 
for such a petition in this case. The rules governing petitions of 
certiorari from the Utah Court of Appeals to this Court are set forth 
in the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rules 45 through 51. 
"Review by a writ of certiorari is not a matter of right, but of 
judicial discretion, and will be granted only for special and 
important reasons." Rule 46 (emphasis added). Rule 46 further states 
four specific reasons which may form a valid basis for consideration 
of issuance of a writ of certiorari. Although they are groundless, 
Hercules petitioned the Court of appeals for rehearing of 
the case based upon several reasons, including those upon 
which Hercules now petitions this Court for a writ of 
certiorari. After briefing by the parties, the Court of 
Appeals granted the petition for rehearing only on the 
issue of attorneys fees which had been awarded under Utah 
Code Annotated § 14-2-3. See, Opinion, Page 20. Since 
the attorneys1 fees provisions in Section 14-2-3 had been 
enacted during the pendency of the appeal to the Utah 
Court of Appeals, the Court of Appeals modified its 
decision by way of an order filed on November 26, 1990, 
and deleted the award of attorneys' fees under Section 
14-2-3. 
6 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Hercules has cited only two of these as the basis for its petition. 
The reasons cited by Hercules are quoted from the rule as follows: 
(b) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has decided 
a question of state or federal law in a way that is in 
conflict with a decision of the Supreme Court; 
* * * 
(d) When the Court of Appeals has decided an important 
question of municipal, state, or federal law which has 
not been, but should be, settled by the Supreme Court. 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 46(b) and (d). Hercules has 
offered no other "special and important reasons" for consideration of 
its petition. 
With regard to subsection (b) of Rule 46, the decision of the 
Court of Appeals does decide issues of Utah State law but none of 
these holdings is in conflict with any decision of the Utah Supreme 
Court. In particular, Hercules claims the decision in Paul Mueller 
Co. v. Cache Valley Dairy Association, 657 P.2d 1279 (Utah 1982) is in 
conflict with the Utah Court of Appeals decision herein. However, the 
Court of Appeals clearly, and correctly, distinguished Mueller from 
the case at bar and held that "buildings" are not to be treated the 
same as personal property/fixtures, to which Mueller applies in 
determining what constitutes a fixture or "improvement" to real 
property. See, Opinion, Pages 8 and 9.3 
Further, even if Mueller were to be applied to determine the 
legal nature of the modular office complexes, the property in question 
clearly meets the Mueller tests and establishes that the modular 
While the Opinion of the Utah Court of Appeals is 
published at 797 P.2d 1123 (Utah App. 1990), Hercules has 
provided a copy of the original Opinion as part of its 
Addendum and all references in its petition for 
certiorari are to the original. Therefore, in order to 
assure consistency, Wagner's references herein will be to 
the original Opinion. 
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office complexes are part of the property interest of Hercules in the 
subject realty.4 Therefore, Hercules' petition based upon subsection 
(b) of Rule 46 is without merit and should be denied.5 
With regard to subsection (d) of Rule 46, Hercules petition is 
even less persuasive. This Court has already determined that the 
issues presented herein are not of the type that need to be settled by 
the Utah Supreme Court. This Court had exclusive appellate jurisdic-
tion pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 78-2-2(3) (j ). However, by 
Order of Transfer dated January 10, 1989 and pursuant to Utah Code 
Annotated § 78-2-2(4) and Rule 4A of the former Utah Rules of the 
Supreme Court, this Court transferred the case to the Utah Court of 
Appeals for determination. 
The issues presented by Hercules petition for certiorari are 
Throughout its petition herein, as in the appeal to the 
Utah Court of Appeals, Hercules attempts to mischaracter-
ize the nature of the office complexes by continually 
referring to them as "mobile". The complexes are no more 
mobile than any other building manufactured in "modular" 
units. The Court of Appeals recognized this literary 
deception and exposed it for what it is -- "inaccurate". 
See, Opinion, Page 10 and 11. 
In claiming that the Court of Appeals decision is in 
conflict with the Mueller case, Hercules completely 
ignores the interface and interplay that Mueller must 
have with several other Utah Supreme Court cases. See, 
Opinion, Pages 8-14; Sanford v. Kunkel, 30 Utah 379, 85 
P.2d 363, modified in part, 85 P.2d 1012 (1906); Stanton 
Transportation Co. v. Davis, 9 Utah 2d 184, 341 P.2d 207 
(1959); Metals Manufacturing Co. v. Bank of Commerce, 16 
Utah 2d 74, 395 P.2d 914 (1964); and King Bros., Inc. v. 
Utah Dry Kiln Company, 21 Utah 2d 43, 440 P. 2d 17 
(1968). When taken as a whole, the Court of Appeals 
decision herein is in harmony with all of the cases 
decided by the Utah Supreme Court. Further, the Court of 
Appeals' decision is supported by other state courts in 
the Western United States. See, Waldorf v. Elliott, 214 
Or. 437, 330 P.2d 355 (1958); and Rinaldi v. Goller, 48 
Cal. 2d 276, 309 P.2d 451 (1957). These cases are 
discussed more fully in the sections that follow. 
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precisely the issues which this Court reviewed in deciding to transfer 
the case to the Court of Appeals. Therefore, the issues presented by 
Hercules do not fall within the scope of Rule 46(d). 
Thus, Hercules has failed to identify for the Court any valid 
"special and important reasons" which would justify the issuance of a 
writ of certiorari or any further delay in the fulfillment of Wagnerfs 
remedies under the Utah mechanic's lien and payment bond statutes. 
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS' OPINION IN THE PRESENT CASE IS NOT IN 
CONFLICT WITH PAUL MUELLER CO. V. CACHE VALLEY DAIRY ASSOCIATION, 
657 P.2D 1279 (UTAH 1982) AND IS IN HARMONY WITH ALL OF THE UTAH 
SUPREME COURT CASES WHICH HAVE BEEN IDENTIFIED. 
The Court of Appeals held that the Mueller case does not apply to 
the present case. It reached this conclusion from a reasoned review 
of the language of the payment bond statute and the mechanic's lien 
statue. With regard to the type of work covered, the language of the 
two statutes is very similar. 
Utah Code Annotated § 14-2-1 (1953 as amended in 1985), states 
that the payment bond provisions apply to "The owner of any interest 
in land entering into a contract, involving $2,000 or more, for the 
construction, addition to, alteration, or repair of any building, 
structure or improvement upon land . . . ." (emphasis added). 
Further, Utah Code Annotated § 38-1-3 (1953 as amended in 1981), 
states that "Contractors, subcontractors and all persons performing 
any services or furnishing or renting any materials or equipment used 
in the construction, alteration, or improvement of any building, 
structure or improvement to any premises in any manner . . . shall 
have a lien upon the property . • . ." (emphasis added). 
The personal property/fixture distinction as discussed in Mueller 
deals with items which are attached to a building (i.e., equipment) 
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rather than to the actual building itself. The Mueller case is 
limited specifically to relatively small individual items rather than 
to entire buildings or structures. Given the statutory language, the 
Court of Appeals concluded that the Mueller test does not apply to two 
buildings containing more than 25,000 square feet of office space. 
On the other hand, to carry Hercules1 argument to its full 
extension, one would have to conclude that the metal building in the 
Mueller case to which the equipment was attached would not give rise 
to a mechanic's lien or to payment bond liability since such metal 
buildings are removable without too much difficulty and would be 
conducive to various uses of the property. However, such was not the 
case in Mueller. The manwalks were considered to be lienable items, 
and, therefore, presumably the building would be a lienable item also. 
With regard to this issue, the operative language of the 
mechanic's lien statute is "the construction, alteration, or 
improvement of any building, structure or improvement to the premises 
in any manner." Utah Code Annotated § 38-1-3 (1953). The operative 
language of the payment bond statute is "the construction, addition 
to, alteration, or repair of any building, structure or improvement 
upon land." Utah Code Annotated § 14-2-1 (1953 as amended in 1985). 
These phrases indicate the type of work which is covered by the 
statutes and the objects of such work. First, there must be construc-
tion, addition to, alteration, or repair work. This work must relate 
to (1) a "building," (2) a "structure," or (3) an "improvement upon 
land." There are three distinct categories in the statute and Muller 
applies only to the last (e.g., improvement upon land). The Court of 
Appeals recognized this distinction and correctly held that Mueller 
does not apply to this case. 
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In Utah, there has never been any question that buildings or 
structures are covered by these statutes, even though they could be 
moved from the land. See, Sanford v. Kunkel, 30 Utah 379, 85 P. 363, 
modified in part, 85 P. 1012 (1906) (mechanic's lien attached to both 
old and new real property when a house was improved at the old 
property and subsequently moved to the new property). See also, 
Stanton Transportation Co. v. Davis, 9 Utah 2d 184, 341 P.2d 207 
(1959) (mechanic's lien allowed for the transportation of a temporary 
structure to the liened property). It is only in connection with 
"improvements upon land11 that the issue of personal property v. 
fixtures became critical. There is no reason to depart from that 
distinction now. Clearly the office complexes comprise buildings or 
structures upon the subject property. Blacks Law Dictionary defines 
"building" as a: 
Structure designed for habitation, shelter, storage, 
trade, manufacture, religion, business, education, and 
the like. A structure or edifice inclosing a space 
within walls, and usually, but not necessarily, covered 
with a roof. 
Black's Law Dictionary 1979, p. 176. Further, Blacks Law Dictionary 
defines "structure" as 
Any construction, or any production or piece 
of work artificially built up or composed of 
parts joined together in some definite manner. 
That which is built or constructed; an edifice or 
building of any kind. 
A combination of materials to form a construction 
for occupancy, use or ornamentation whether installed 
on, above, or below the surface of a parcel of land. 
Black's Law Dictionary 1979, p. 1276. See also, 12 C.J.S. Building 
(1980). 
It is important to note that there is no requirement for 
affixation or attachment to the land upon which it is placed. In fact 
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the definition of structure specifically allows for installation above 
the land. 
Such a result has been indicated previously by the Utah Supreme i 
Court in the case of King Brothers, Inc. v. Utah Dry Kiln Company, 21 
Utah 2d 43, 440 P.2d 17 (1968). The Court stated: 
The duty of obtaining a bond as imposed by ( 
Section 14-2-1 is upon: "The owner of any 
interest in land" who enters into a contract to 
construct an improvement thereon. The word 
"land" as used in the law, has since time 
immemorial been regarded as a generic term. It 
"* * * includes not only the soil, but everything < 
attached to it, whether by nature, as trees, 
herbage, and water, or by the hand of man, as 
buildings, fixtures, and fences." This is 
particularly true with respect to these lien 
statutes which should be liberally construed to 
effectuate their purposes. This court has 
allowed a materialman's lien to attach to 
interests less than fee simple, such as a 
leasehold estate, an equitable interest, and a 
building separate and apart from the soil upon 
which it was erected. (citations omitted) 
(emphasis in original) 
King Brothers at 440 P.2d 19. 
It is clear that the Utah Supreme Court views "buildings" as 
separate and distinct from "fixtures." A building does not have to be 
attached to the soil in the same manner as a fixture must be attached 
in order to give rights to mechanic's lien and bond rights. It is 
sufficient that the "buildings" or "structures" of this magnitude be 
placed upon the land. Thus, buildings or structures of the magnitude 
in this case should be deemed to be part of the realty upon which they 
are placed regardless of the manner in which they are placed upon the 
land. 
This is particularly true given the ability of man to move even 
traditionally constructed buildings with relative ease and the advance 
12 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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technology in the area o f pre-manufactured or existing buildi i igs 
l i n i c I in n i i . s p n i 1 i M I h i l l n i I » (iiim) p l d i r F M l u p o n I I'm I  MI I I t I M I 
transported from • ^J.- * another The case of Sanford v. Kunkel, 
-• ntah 379, 85 I- - < * ' provides an example i su^r n •• *u^+i * 
t c.".',iif;i;e b ! . ' 
moved from one parcel another after improvement:: u 
building i mx e in ; uiat d mechanicf s H e n could attach iu UULII 
parcels of ] ai id. . 
The fact that llu» office complexes i n the present case can be 
tor i i l i p r i f 1 i i im in I in in in I » " t M II " • , " """•*' L 1l -' 
as stated in Sanford. •-.- :.*! as Wagner v ..ni^ ib concerned, the w :> 
required :* construct the office complexes w I M P jn- for • -•<• 
that this construction project * i ; ci mechanic s lien r 
payment bond protection a*? i other construction proie* f~ 
I« \ i 15 ••- • * . tractor oetween 
Hercules HI., the Navy as to v he status \ • h^ office complexes shouni 
not alter ? ! ^  itcome ui ?-•*- bindinc • 1. • 1 "• 
stranger to tr.du transaction, being t;!i e 1 emoved ;, ontract 
chain from the Hercules/Navy contract and twice removed from the 
Hercules/Modulr 
case of Saunders v. Kidman, 284 < .^  Saunders n 
purchaser re^: property succeeded i - ^ ishing that ^ -ti 
between the seller and hird-party that the cabin could to emoved. 
Thp tri a! court found, and l~ho Hi ah Supreme Court held, uiai *;-
Ai'eei 1 Ill le sel; I ei: ai id the lln ul--par Ly the cabin, was personal property 
bi 1 t as between : >* seller and the purchaser the cabin was part of the 
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realty. 
Similarly, in the case at bar, it was appropriate for the Court 
of Appeals to not rely too heavily on the agreements to which Wagner 
was not privy. As between Hercules and Wagner, the office complexes 
should be deemed to be part of the realty. Such a holding makes good 
common sense. 
Such a holding not only make good common sense, it is in accord 
with other Utah case law. In Metals Manufacturing Co. v. Bank of 
Commerce, 16 Utah 2d 74, 395 P.2d 914 (1964), the Utah Supreme Court 
confronted a situation similar to the one presented in the present 
case. In Metals Manufacturing, the Bank of Commerce held a 10-year 
lease which provided that the Bank could "make alterations, attach 
fixtures, and erect additions * * *" which would remain the property 
of the bank and be removed upon the expiration of the lease. A 
second-tier supplier and installer of metal hand rails and grates made 
a claim for failure to obtain a bond and the Bank defended on the 
basis that the goods did not become fixtures due to the provisions in 
the lease specifying that they remain the personal property of the 
Bank. The trial court ruled in favor of the Bank and dismissed the 
supplier's cause of action. In reversing the trial court, the Utah 
Supreme Court held that: 
[I]t would seem unrealistic and unreasonable to con-
clude that [the bank and its contractor] by agreeing 
among themselves, could bind third party suppliers of 
materials to the terms of an agreement to which such 
suppliers were not privies and the terms of which they 
did not know. Such conclusion could result in the easy 
circumvention of the statute whose purpose clearly is 
to protect suppliers, if what they supply falls within 
the clear import of the statute. (emphasis in 
original) 
Id. at 395 P.2d 914, 915. 
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The Utah Supreme Court had another occasic1- -•• discuss this 
principle. The Couir I MimniiHr i znii its' lv lllrli, n.-| in Metals Manufacturing 
rii'i iollows: 
We tie Id that irrespective of tl le agreement of tl: le 
parties inter se, as to third-party suppliers, the 
installation should be regarded as part of the realty. 
It was pointed out that it would be unfair to bind such 
suppliers to the terms of agreements to which they were 
not parties and of whose contents they had no 
knowledge. 
King Bro bl ie.i s , li IC. v. 'Utah Dry Kiln Company, ^ TT+-ah ?-* 43 M ° n " 7 
1,8 (1968) As i n both the Metals Manufacturing and King ^retho •-. 
cases it would be unreasonablt * * -*• * P I 
agreements between Hercules < ; Government or between 
Hercules and Modulaire. 
posi t:::i oi I tc • de . - •*- :;.; ,. * of u*"»rculon 
v, ., respect these office complexes and this Court si ,i mil 
impose sue > burder TIi particularly t n u i i<i, 
K
* <• JJy no different than those furnished 
^ Wagner -*r raditiona: , constructed buildings, There was no 
indication whatsoever thev ' piojo< I M:HI 1 i;i not Afford I! he Wagner 
} •• ;i«L;ii; the nechani* "s li.;?. >x\ " payment bond statutes. 
In fact, Wagner •-*..-: everything -- »• • ;o,ver to protect its ricjM • 
granted under the I Jta' ' •• * I f Hercules '"hose in 
i 91 * : ,I;I © its obligations , *.;. - working en or supplying materials to 
construction project- This Court has stated that: 
. . . The bond, as in this
 Case[,] is conditioned for 
the faithful performance of the contract and securing 
the payment of the laborers ai id materialmen, if the 
owner requires the contractor to procure the statutory 
bond, he is protected against loss. If he does not, he 
becomes liable to laborers and materialmen if the 
contractor fails to pay them, even though he may have 
paid the contractor in full. He has his remedy in his 
own hands. 
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i 
Rio Grande Lumber Co. v. Darke, 50 Utah 114, 127, 167 P. 241, 246 
(1917) (emphasis added). Thus, Hercules had its remedy in its own 
hands but chose to flout the statutory requirement to obtain a payment 
bond. 
III. NEITHER THE UTAH PAYMENT BOND STATUTE, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED § 14-
2-1 ET SEQ. (1953 AS AMENDED IN 1985), NOR THE UTAH MECHANIC'S 
LIEN STATUTE, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED § 38-1-1 ET SEQ. (1953 AS 
AMENDED PRIOR TO 1985), REQUIRE FEE OWNERSHIP FOR THEIR 
APPLICATION TO THE CASE AT BAR. 
Utah Code Annotated § 14-2-1 (1953 as amended in 1985) states, in 
pertinent part: 
The owner of any interest in land entering into a 
contract, involving $2,000 or more, for the construc-
tion, addition to, alteration, or repair of any 
building, structure or improvement upon land shall . . 
. obtain from the contractor a bond . . . . 
(emphasis added). 
Utah Code Annotated § 38-1-3 (1953 as amended in 1981) states, in 
pertinent part that "Such [mechanic's] liens shall attach to only such 
interest as the owner may have in the property . . . . 
(emphasis added). 
The subject real property is owned by the United States 
Government and controlled by the Navy. Hercules uses this real 
property to produce missiles for the Government. In exchange for the 
use of the subject real property, Hercules sells the missiles to the 
Government than it otherwise would. 
While neither the trial court nor the Court of Appeals felt it 
necessary to identify the exact nature of Hercules' interest in the 
real property upon which the modular office complexes were placed, 
there is no doubt that both viewed Hercules' interest as being 
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sufficient to invoke the payment bond statute provisions. 6 
The trial court did, however JPIU-I : .. ma I 'r" -«" " i. t " .' 
Hercules 1 interest i n the i: ea] property pursuant to tl le Use Contract 
was not alienable, even though that H Q P Contract contained d 
1 ii i d e i: wl :i 1 <li I !<-* r < 1 1 t m I  HI keep the property f - ee 
from encumbrances : * basis * *m perceived inalienabil: t M 
trial court held t-ha*- 5 mechanic' ^  : le; - nIM in-1 affvn Ii. 
1 i i t: ei: es 1: a: id . smissed Wagnei mechanj • >i dus^ * action 
summary judgment pri JZ J • : 
Tho triaj. c * i^e any 
restrictions on the nature ol: 1,1 IH property interest attached, 'i"he 
mechanic's 1 i en attaches such interest as the owner may hewn* "i 
I he p r o p e r ^ ," As .n pra,(/t, i \ A\ rua I lor. , some real property interests 
may not bring a very high price at a foreclosure sale ..\ L_ does 
not mean that the encumbrance foreclosed does i • -* 
l-'iiii I; h e y w h i I t IHi-i'i" % "ij 1 o i . c i i n l I III' <• IN j , , ,„ p l a c e d some 
c o n d i t i o n s upon t h e u se oil: the p r o p e r t y , tha t ; d o e s not n e c e s s a r i l y 
b ind Wagner. The Court o f Appeals , M ip"prqiiii | iim i i • ,*i i inpf 
t h i s i ,-,»bijti' :•> Ld L e d : 
Materialmen and laborers, who have "\^ ^ racLoai wav 
of knowing the legal status of the property they 
improve, [King Bros., Inc. v. Utah Dry Kiln Company, 21 
Utah 2d 43, 440 P. 2d 17, 19 (1968)], would not know in 
advance whether the property they are improving 
tainted by a restraint on alienability . . . . 
The trial court's ruling was not that Hercules interest 
in the property was insufficient to invoke the payment 
bond statute. To the contrary, the trial court had 
already ruled on that threshold issue and had determined 
Hercules' interest in the real property sufficient. 
Thus, the trial court refused to dismiss the payment bond 
cause of action on Hercu] esf motion for summary judgment 
prior to trial. 
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Ultimately, recognizing alienability as a precondition 
to the attachment of a mechanic's lien would destroy 
the Mechanic's Lien Statute. Owners could easily 
circumvent the Mechanic's Lien Statute by simply 
creating an alienable interest in land or in the 
building. We will not adopt a rule permitting such 
ready circumvention of the Mechanic's Lien Statute. 
[Metals Manufacturing Co. v. Bank of Commerce, 16 Utah 
74, 395 P.2d 914, 915 (1964)]. 
Opinion at p.15. 
Thus, the Court of Appeals correctly ruled that the alienability 
of a particular property should not be considered in determining 
whether a mechanic's lien could attach. 
IV. THE STANDARD OF REVIEW EMPLOYED BY THE COURT OF APPEALS WAS 
CORRECT. 
In its opinion herein, the Court of Appeals stated: 
Inasmuch as the issues before us are limited to 
questions of law, namely, questions of statutory 
interpretation, no deference need to be given to the 
trial court's conclusions. Forbes v. St. Mark's 
Hospital, 754 P. 2d 933, 934 (Utah 1988). We therefore, 
we review the trial Court's statutory interpretations 
for correctness. Copper State Thrift and Loan v. 
Bruno, 735 P.2d 387, 389 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
Opinion at p. 6. Thus, the Court of Appeals employed the "correctness" 
standard in reviewing the issues presented in Wagner's appeal. 
The issues presented in Wagner's appeal were presented as legal 
issues and Hercules defended them as such. Hercules now seeks to have 
this Court impose a standard of review established for factual 
issues.7 The facts in this case were largely undisputed. Thus, the 
Court of Appeals did not disturb any of the factual issues on which 
the trial court had made findings. The Court of Appeals reviewed the 
Again, even if a factual standard of review were more 
appropriate, which it is not, that would not constitute 
a "special and important reason" for considering the 
issuance of a writ of certiorari. Further, Hercules has 
waived any such argument. 
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record for all of the undisputed facts relevant to the I eg a ] issues it 
was callcvl ii| JI \* ' i li-»c i die and i el \-t\ »"aii! 11 » the statutory 
interpretations it was called upon to ni.ike, 
Even the authorities that Hercules cites in its petition liuppoi is 
l l H" siand.-nT d i P Court ut Appeals. 
The appellate court., does not consider and weigh 
the evidence de novo. The mere fact that on the same 
evidence the appellate court might have reached a 
different result does not justify It in setting the 
findings aside. It may regard a finding as clearly 
erroneous only if the finding is without adequate 
evidentiary support or induced by an erroneous view of 
the law. 
State v. Walker, 743 P. 2d (Utah 1987) (citing Wright J- -ixubi, 
Federal Practic* - e- h u c e u . ^ 
This same approach was used hy I.ho Court .in Waldorf v. Elliott, 
214 Or. 437 380 P.?,d 355 (L958)r upon which the Court of Appeal:;! 
r e l i e d i 11 11,11 i i m M I I t i, i |i H I ;>upj <'imJ ( i n 11 i stated that: 
[T]he problem of whether an article is oi is not a 
fixture is by nature a mixed question of law and fact 
and as such is susceptible to review . . . . [W]e can 
in any case correct any misapplication of the law to 
the facts. 
Id. at 330 P.2d 357, 
Even mor <•?*••:•
 s , <= 
( review two legal issues, ot 'icuo, ; jsuen issues 
presented by Hercules are clear v °,. ?HI ature. Whi 
by i he fac* .. - * ii1i -
complexes and the statutory interpretations required it > is -*?«- o 
legal issues <u • • clears --rroneoi. ' - *-
Her . "correctness" standard used by thi* 
Court o f Appeals is correct ,.. 
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< 
V. CONCLUSION. 
Hercules has failed to identify any valid reasons for this Court 
to consider the issuance of a writ of certiorari. The Opinion of the ^ 
Court of Appeals is not in conflict with any decisions of the Utah 
Supreme Court. To the contrary, the Court of Appeals1 Opinion is in 
harmony with the full body of case law interpreting the Utah < 
mechanic's lien and payment bond statutes. Further, Hercules holds a 
property interest in the subject real property as well as an interest 
in the office complexes which is sufficient for Wagner's mechanic's
 { 
lien to attach. The Court of Appeals applied the proper standard of 
review to the legal issues presented in the appeal. Hercules other 
arguments contained in its petition are equally without merit. 
Utah's mechanic's lien and bond laws are liberally construed to 
protect those who provide labor, materials and equipment for projects 
such as the modular office complexes built for Hercules. Hercules had 
its "remedy in its own hands" and chose to ignore its statutory 
obligations. This Court should not punish Wagner for Hercules' 
failure to obtain a payment bond. 
Wagner respectfully requests that this Court deny Hercules' 
petition for a writ of certiorari and allow the case to be remanded in 
accordance with the Court of Appeals' decision. 
DATED this 28th day of January, 1991. 
WALSTAD & BABCOCK 
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